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[L. A. No. 28903.

In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1967.]

. LEE REICH, Individually and as Administrator, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. JOSEPH PURCELL, Defendant and Respondent.
[1] Con1lict of La.ws-La.w Governing Remedy: Torts.-In a complex situation involving multi-statt' contacts, no single state
alone can be deemed to create exclusively. governing rights.
The forum must search to find the proper law to apply, based
on the interests of the litigants and the involved states.
[2] Id.-Torts.-In conflict cases, the law of the place of the
wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort actions
brought in the courts of this state, and the ease of determin. ing applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision must he
subordinated to the objective of proper choice of law, namely,
. to determine the law that most appropriately applies to the
issue involved (overruling Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362,
366 [10 P.2d 63], Ryan v. North .Alaska SaZmon Co., 153 Cal.
438 [95 P. 862] and other cases to the contrary).
[3] Id.-Torts-Actions for Wrongful Death.-In a wrongful
death action brought in California following an automobile
accident in Missouri, defendant's liability should not be limited to the $25,000 maximum un(1er Missouri law, where California had no interest in applyi~g its laws to plaintiffs, since
they were domiciled in Ohio at the time of the accident, or to
defendant, because, although he was domiciled in California,
there was no statutory limitation of damages in California,
and where the interests of Ohio, also without statutory limita-

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 79; Am.Jur.2d, Conflict of
Laws, § 71.
[3] Conflict of laws as to measure or amount of damages in
death actions, note, 92 A.L.R.2d 1180. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Conflict
of Laws, § 82; Am.Jur.2d, Death, § 277.
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Conflict of Laws, §§ 2, 13; [2] Con:ftict of Laws, § 13; [3] Conflict of Laws, § 14; Death, § 48.
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tion, in affording full recovery to its domiciliaries did not
conflict with any substantial interest in Missouri, in which
none of the parties was domiciled .
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APPEAL from a portion of a judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County. Stevens Fargo, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Action for wrongful death resulting from an automobile
collision in another state. Portion of judgment awarding damages reversed with directions.
i,

Irell & Manella, Charles H. Phillips, Richard H. Borow and
J. Gordon Hansen for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
John R. Allport for Defendant and Respondent.
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TRAY'NOR, C. J.-This wrongful death action arose out of
a h.ead-on collision of two automobiles in Missouri. One of the
automobiles was owned and operated by defendant Joseph
Purcell, a resident and domiciliary of California who was on
his way to a vacation in Illinois. The. other automobile was
owned and operated by Mrs. Reich, the wife of plaintiff Lee
Reich.- T.he Reichs then resided in Ohio and Mrs. Reich and
the Reichs' two children, Jay and Jeffry, were on their way
to -California, where the Reichs were contemplating settling.
Mrs. Reich and Jay were killed in the collision, and Jeffry
was injured.
Plaintiffs, Lee Reich and Jeffry Reich, are the heirs of Mrs.
Reich and Lee Reich is the heir of Jay Reich. Plaintiffs moved
to California and became permanent residents here after the
accident. The estates of :Mrs. Reich and Jay Reich are being
administered in Ohio.
The parties stipulated that judgment be entered in specified
amounts for the wrongful death of Jay, for the personal injuries suffered by Jeffry, and for the damages to Mrs. Reich's
automobile. For the death of Mrs. Reich they stipulated that
judgment be entered for $55,000 or $25,000 depending· on the
court's ruling on t.he applicability of the Missouri limitation
of damages to a maximum of $25,000. (Vernon's Ann. Mo.
Stats. § 537.090.)1 Neither Ohio nor California limit recovery
l.Amo-unt of damages recoverable. "In every action brought under
tion 537.080 [action for wrongful death], the jury may give to the
viving party or parties who may be entitled to sue such damages,
exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars, as the jury may deem fair
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in wrongful death actions. 2 The trial court held that the Missouri limitation applied because the accident occurred there
and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs appeal.
For many years courts applied the law of the place of the
wrong in tort actions regardless of the issues before the court,
e.g., whether they involved conduct, survival of actions, applicability of a wrongful death statute, immunity from liability, or other rules determining whether a legal injury has
been sustained. (See Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366
[10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264] ; Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon
Co., 153 Cal. 438, 439 [95 P. 862] ; Rest., Conflict of Laws, § 378
et seq.) It was assumed that the law of the place of the wrong
created the cause of action and necessarily detennined the
extent of the liability (Slater v. Mexican Nat. R.R. Co., 194
U.S. 120, 126 [48 L.Ed. 900, 902, 24 8.Ct. 581].) Aside from
procedural difficulties (see Currie, Selected Essays on Conflict
of Laws (1963) pp. 10-18), this theory worked well enough
when all the relevant events took place in one jurisdiction, but
the action was brought in another. [1] In a complex situation involving multi-state contacts, however, no single state
alone can be deemed to create exclusively governing rights.
(Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 42 [13 L.Ed.2d 641,
643, 85 8.Ct. 769] ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.8. 179,
181-182 [12 L.Ed.2d 229, 231, 84 S.Ct. 1197] ; Watson v. Employers Liab. Cfnp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 [99 L.Ed. 74, 81-82, 75
8. Ct. 166].) The forum must search to find the proper law to
apply based upon the interests of the litigants and the involved states. Such complex cases elucidate what the simpler
cases obscured, namely, that the forum can only apply its own
law. (See Lein v. Parkin, 49 Ca1.2d 397 [318 P.2d 1] ; Grant
v. McAulzffe, 41 Cal.2d 859 [264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162J ;
W. W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Basis of Conflict of Laws
(1942) pp. 20-21; Cavers, Two" Local Law" The01'ies, 63
Harv. L. Rev. 822-824.) When it purports to do otherwise, it
is not enforcing foreign rights but choosing a foreign rule of
decision as the appropriate one to apply to the case before it.
just for the death and loss thus occasioned, with reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death, and having regard for mitigating
or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act, neglect or default resulting in such death. . . ."
20hio Constitution, article I, section 19a: "The amount of damages
recoverable by civil action in the courts for death caused by wrongful
act, neglect or default of another, shall not be limited by law." California
Code of Civil Procedure, section 377: "In every action under this section. such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the
ease. may be just. • . ."
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Moreover, it has now been demonstrated that a choice of law
resulting from a hopeless search for a governing foreign law
to create a foreign vested right may defeat the legitimate
interests of the litigants and the states involved. (See, generally, Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965) ; Currie, Selected Essays on. Conflict of Laws, supra; Ehrenzweig, Conflict of
Laws (1962).)
Accordingly, when application of the law of the place of the
wrong would defeat the interests of the litigants and of the
states concerned, we have not applied that law. (Grant v.
McAuliffe, supra, 41 Ca1.2d 859, 867; Emery v. Emery, 45
Ca1.2d 421, 428 [289 P.2d 218].) Grant was an action for
personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident in
Arizona between California residents. The driver whose negligence caused the accident died, and the court had to choose
between the California rule that allowed an action against the
personal representative and the Arizona rule that did not. We
held that since "all of the parties were residents of this state,
and the estate of the deceased tortfeasor is being administered
in this state, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their causes of action is governed by the laws of this state relating to administration ot estates." Under these circumstances application of
the law of the place of the wrong would not only have defeated California's interest and that of its residents but
would have advanced no interest of Arizona or its residents.
(Grant v. McAuliffe, supra, 41 Cal.2d at 867.) In Emery
members of a California family were injured in Idaho when
another member of the family who was driving lost control of
the car and it went off the road. The question was whether
Idaho or California law determined when one member of a
family was immune from tort liability to another. We applied
the law of the family domicile rather than the law of the place
of the wrong. "That state has the primary responsibility for
establishing and regUlating the incidents of the family relationship and it is t.he only state in which the parties can, by
participation in the legislative processes, effect a change in
those incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights,
duties, disabilities, and immunities conferred or imposed by
the family relationship should constantly change as members
of the family cross state boundaries. during temporary absences from their home. ,! (45 Cal.2d at p. 428.)
Defendant contends, however, that there were compelling
reasons in the Grfllnt and Emery cases for departing from the
law of the place of the wrong and that such reasons are not
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present in this case. He urges that application of that law
promotes uniformity of decisions, prevents forum shopping,
and avoids the uncertainties that may result from ad hoc
searches for a more appropriate law in this and similar cases.
[2] Ease of determining applicable law and uniformity
of rules of decision, however, must be subordinated to the
objective of proper choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to
de~rmine the law that most appropriately applies to the issue
involved (see LeBar, Choice-Influencing Considerations In
Conflicts Law (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 267, 279-282). Moreover, as jurisdiction after jurisdiction has departed from the
law of the place of the wrong as the controlling law in tort
cases, regardless of the issue involved (see Romero v. International Terminal, Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381-384 [3 L.Ed.
2d 368, 387-389, 79 S.Ct. 468] [Admiralty]; Wartell v. Formusa (1966) 34 Ill.2d 57 [213 N.E.2d 544]; W. H. Barber
Co. v. Hughes (1945) 223 Ind. 570 [63 N.E.2d 417]; Wessling
v. Paris (Ky.App. 1967) 417 S.W.2d 259; Clark v. Clark
(1966) 107 N.H. 351 [222 A.2d 205] ; Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473 [191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1] ; Casey v. Manson Constr. &- Engineering Co. (1967) - - Ore. - - [428
P.2d 898] ; G'rijJith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964) 416 Pa. 1
[203 A.2d 796] ; Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis.
2d 130 [95 N.W.2d 814]), that law no longer affords even a
semblance of the general applicat.ion that was once thought to
be its great virtue. We conclude that the law of the place of
the wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort
actions brought in the courts of this state. Loranger v. Nadeau, Sll-pra, 215 Cal. 362, 366; Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon
Co., supra, 153 Cal. 438, and other cases to the contrary are
overruled.
[8] As the forum we must consider all of the foreign and
domestic elements and interests involved in this case to determine the rule applicable. Three states are involved. Ohio is
where plaintiffs and their decedents resided before the accident and where the decedents' estates are being administered.
Missouri is the place of the wrong. California is the place
where defendant resides and is the forum. Although plaintiffs
now reside in California, their residence and domicile at the
time of the accident are the relevant residence and domicile.
At the time of the accident the plans to change the family
domicile were not definite and fixed, and if t.he choice of law
were made to turn on events happening after the accident,
forum shopping would be encouraged. (See Cavers, ~. cit.,
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supra, p. 151, fn. 16.) Accordingly, plaintiffs' present domicile in California does not give this state any interest in applying its law, and since California has no limitation of damages,
it also has no interest in applying its law on behalf of defendant. As a forum that is therefore disinterested in the only
issue in dispute, we must decide whether to adopt the Ohio or
the Missouri rule as the rule of decision for this case.
Missouri is concerned with conduct within her borders and
as to such conduct she has the predominant interest of the
states involved. Limitations of jamages for wrongful death,
however, llave little or nothing to do with conduct. They are
concerned not with how people should behave but with how
survivors should be compensated. The state of the place of the
wrong has little or no interest in such compensation when
none of the parties reside there. Wrongful death statutes create causes. of action in specified beneficiaries and distribute
the proceeds to those beneficiaries. The proceeds in the hands
of the beneficiaries are not distributed through the decedent's
estate and, therefore, arc not subject to the claims of the
decedent's creditors and consequently do not provide a fund
for local creditors. Accordingly, the interest of a state in a
wrongful death action insofar as plaintiffs are concerned is in
determining the distribution of proceeds to the beneficiaries
and that interest extends only to loeal decedents and beneficiaries. (Currie, OPe cit., supra, pp. 690,702.) Missouri's limitation on damages expresses an additional concern for defendants, however, in that it operates to avoid the imposition of
excessive financial burdens on them. That concern is
also primarily local and we fail to perceive any substantial interest Missouri mig}lt have in extending the benefits
of its limitation of damages to travelers from states having no
similar limitation. Defendant's liability should not be limited
when no party to the action is from a state limiting liability
and when defendant, therefore, would have secured insurance,
if any, without any such limit in mind. A defendant cannot
reasonably complain when compensatory damages are assessed
in accordance with the law of his domicile and plaintiffs receive no more than they would had they been injured at home.
(See Cavers, Ope cit., supra, pp. 153-157.) Under these circumstances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to injured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of Missouri. (Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Ca1.2d
588, 595 [12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, the
Missouri limitation does not apply. (Accord: Gianni V. Fort
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Wayne Air Service, Inc. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621; Watts
Pioneer Corn Co. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617; Pearson V.
Northeast Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1962) 309 F.2d 553, 92
A.L.R.2d 1162; Fabricius v. IIorgen (1965) 257 Iowa 268
[132 N.\V.2d 410] ; Farber V. Smolack (N.Y. 1967) 36 U.S.L.
Week 2075; Long V. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
(1965) 16 N.Y.2d 337 [213 N.E.2d 796] ; Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 [172 N.E.2d 526] j Griffith V.
United Air Lines, Inc., supra, 416 Pa. 1.)
The part of the judgment appealed from is reversed with
directions to the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $55,000 in accordance with the stipulations of the parties.
V.

-)

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J.} Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
On November 29, 1967, the opinion was modified to read
as printed above.

